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Abstract
Smartphones hold important private information,
yet users routinely expose this information to ques-
tionable applications written by developers they
know nothing about. Users may be tempted to
think of smartphones as old-style dumb phones, not
as powerful network-connected computers, and this
opens a gap between the permissions-based secu-
rity paradigm (offered by platforms like Android)
and what users expect. This makes it easy to fool
users into installing applications that steal their in-
formation. Not surprisingly, Android is now a more
favored target for hackers than Windows [14].
We propose an approach for closing this gap,
based on the observation that the current per-
missions system—rooted in good ol’ UNIX-style
thinking—is both too coarse and too fine grained,
because it uses the wrong axes for defining the
permissions space. We argue for replacing the
paradigm in which “an app accesses device re-
sources” (which is foreign to most non-geeks) with
a paradigm in which “an app accesses user-tangible
services.” By using a simple piece of middleware,
we can wrap this view of application control around
today’s permission system, and, by doing so, no
conceptual refactoring of applications is required.
1 Introduction
Mobile applications (“apps”) have captured the
mind and soul of consumers, with much of the com-
petition in the smartphone arena revolving around
the variety and coolness of apps available on a given
device. An average smartphone owner has more
than 40 applications installed [1], actively uses 15 of
them, and spends more than ten hours a month inter-
acting with these applications—more time is spent
with apps than spent talking on the phone or using
it to browse the Web [13].
Most users do not know what exactly their in-
stalled apps do or have access to. Do they read the
address book and send the contacts to spammers?
Do they track the user’s movements via GPS? Do
they turn on the phone’s camera/microphone and
spy on the user? This is serious, because smart-
phones, unlike computers, are always on, network-
connected, and always with their user.
Today’s smartphones are powerful computers,
but it is easy for users to think of them as “dumb”
phones; the magic by which apps can dynamically
augment the functionality of this “phone” is not
fully understood and is therefore ignored. Cer-
tain concepts, such as “app permissions” do not re-
ally have an equivalent in the world of traditional
phones. Discrepancies of this sort create a gap that,
from a security standpoint, invites exploitation. We
aim to bridge this gap by making the concept of app
and app permissions more “natural” to users, thus
making it easier to understand and manage.
We start by looking at Android, both because
of its popularity and because we think it has im-
portant weaknesses in this context. Android per-
missions were conceived to mitigate the threats de-
scribed above, by putting the user in control: users
must explicitly grant the app, at installation time,
access to the resources it requires. Unfortunately,
many Android permissions are too coarse grained,
thus leading to a violation of the “least privilege”
principle. For example, a weather forecast applica-
tion may simply need to download data from a spe-
cific server, but in the current Android Permissions
System a user would have to give this app full Inter-
net access. Other permissions are too technical for
average users, like “use SIP service” or “change the
Z-order of tasks.” A puzzled user trying to choose
between saying “no” and getting to (install and) use
the app will likely opt for the latter. And, in so do-
ing, the user may unwittingly hand over to the app
control over his/her data.
Our goal is to eliminate the mismatch between
user expectations and actual app behavior, as per-
tains to user data. We describe a split/merge ap-
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proach for morphing the Android Permissions Sys-
tem into user-meaningful permissions: split proxies
on the phone turn permissions that are too coarse
into finer ones, and merge proxies combine low-
level or too-technical permissions into semantically
meaningful ones. Permissions and proxies form a
hierarchy, and applications access the top layer of
this hierarchy. We envision service providers (such
as AdMob, Facebook, or Google Analytics) defin-
ing the permissions by writing such proxies and pro-
viding them to developers as part of their SDKs.
Before describing our approach in more detail,
we briefly present the Android Permissions System.
2 Android Permissions: The Good and the Bad
Each mainstream smartphone platform has its
own security model, with pros and cons. iOS and
Windows Phone 8 control apps’ behavior largely by
testing them before admitting them in the respec-
tive app store/marketplace; users trust Apple and
Microsoft to do proper checking of the apps. Of
course, full verification of an app is still an open
challenge, and apps can still misbehave [15]. An-
droid, however, defers the choice for what an app is
allowed to do to the end user. We believe the ideal
smartphone security model will offer users some
level of choice, and thus the question of how to for-
mulate and grant permissions will remain pertinent.
This makes Android an interesting research target.
2.1 Android Permissions System: AnOverview
The Android Permissions System [2] allows de-
velopers to specify a list of accesses and permis-
sions their app needs in order to function properly;
this list is part of the app’s manifest file. These
permissions control access to sensitive device APIs,
such as the camera, the microphone, or GPS sensor.
Which permissions are granted to an app is de-
cided upfront, at app installation time—after instal-
lation, apps cannot request additional permissions.
When a user installs an app, the operating system
displays the list of requested permissions (see for
example Figure 1). Presumably, the user reads the
list, makes an informed decision on whether to grant
or not the requested permissions, and clicks Install
or Cancel. Installation can only proceed if the user
accepts all requested permissions.
Underneath the covers, Android (which runs a
modified Linux kernel) enforces its security poli-
cies by mapping applications and permissions onto
Figure 1: Installing Android apps: On the left, a weather
forecast app requests full access to the Internet (unnecessar-
ily coarse grained). On the right, a VoIP app requests access
to “send sticky broadcast,” “reroute outgoing calls,” etc. (too
technical for an average user).
UNIX-style users and groups, respectively. When
installing a new app, Android creates a new userid
for it, and runs the app as that user. Android main-
tains one usergroup for each permission and, if the
user grants a particular permission at install time,
the app’s userid is added to the respective usergroup.
When the app invokes system services, the ker-
nel checks whether the app is entitled to make the
respective system call or not (e.g., if an app tries
to create a network socket but its userid does not
belong to the “Internet access” usergroup, Android
denies the socket creation attempt). Enforcement
is performed in the kernel so that even native code
cannot bypass the permissions system.
The benefit of the Android Permissions System is
that the operating system promises users that each
app will only be allowed to access the APIs that
were granted by the user at install time. Further-
more, a user can determine at any time what permis-
sions an app has by looking at its list of permissions,
which is available post-installation.
2.2 Shortcomings
Unfortunately, most users are not prepared to
exercise their right to choose, because some An-
droid permissions can be incomprehensible to them.
These typically relate to device details that are out-
side the user’s realm of comprehension (access Sur-
faceFlinger, broadcast WAP PUSH receipt notifica-
tions, perform I/O over NFC, etc.). In a recent study,
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only 17% of users were aware of the requested per-
missions list and, of those, only 3% had some under-
standing of the permissions’ meaning, power, and
consequences [9]. In our experience, even tech-
nical users make the decision based on intuition
rather than careful analysis. This is because, even
when understanding what the permissions are about,
reasoning about how a combination of permissions
might compromise privacy or security is difficult.
At the same time, some Android permissions
force the violation of the “least privilege” princi-
ple by being too coarse-grained, as illustrated by
the weather forecast app in Figure 1. Another com-
mon case is when a non-networked app uses a li-
brary/SDK to show ads (e.g., via AdMob) or to
collect usage statistics (e.g., via Google Analytics):
even though the user knows the app should not re-
quire Internet access, the fact that it is ad-supported
forces it to ask for such access. This way, users
are trained to accept that any reasonable app needs
Internet access. This is problematic, given that al-
most 25% of today’s free Android apps request ac-
cess to private user information (location data, de-
mographic information, etc.) claiming it is used for
targeted ads only, but this data ends up being sent to
the app provider’s servers [11, 5, 4]. Careful users
have little choice too: by being conservative and re-
jecting such apps, one is deprived by much of what
makes a smartphone compelling.
The current Android Permissions System is both
too fine-grained and too coarse-grained at the same
time. This paradoxical situation stems from the per-
missions being defined along the (in our opinion)
wrong axes: the permissions system is thought in
terms of apps accessing device resources, and this
is a highly OS-centric view of what the smartphone
does. It leaves to the user to extrapolate which
user-visible services could be accessed via those re-
sources, or which user data could be read/written.
We argue that, instead, the permissions system
should use as primitives those abstractions and ser-
vices that are user-visible, such as ad services, web
sites that can be browsed by the user, etc.
3 Our Approach: Split / Merge Proxies
Our goal is to enable users to more easily map
permissions to “tangible” services. To make this
possible, our system is a new layer introduced be-
tween the OS and the apps (Figure 2). It consists
of a hierarchy of permission proxies. A permis-
sion proxy takes permissions from a lower layer
and transforms them into a new permission exposed
to the upper layer. We have two types of per-
mission proxies: split proxies that divide permis-
sions into finer-grain ones, and merge proxies that
combine multiple permissions into a semantically
higher-level one.
3.1 Proxy-based Permission System
Proxies are built as thin Android apps that lever-
age Android’s flexibility for defining new permis-
sions, thus not requiring changes to the OS in most
cases. Each proxy X declaring a new permission
P also defines an API corresponding to the use
of P. For example, as will be detailed later, us-
ing a selective form of HTTP access would re-
quire using the SelectiveHttpClient class pro-
vided by the corresponding proxy, instead of the
DefaultHttpClient class. When an app requests
permission P, our system ensures that the app uses
the API exposed by P, and prevents it from circum-
venting X to go straight to the APIs used by X . In
other words, X interposes hermetically between the
app and the permission(s) underneath X .
Apps are generally written using various SDKs
(for example, the Google Analytics SDK), and we
envision such SDKs defining the proxy/proxies they
need. The proxies themselves will typically be writ-
ten by the provider of the SDK, but it is possible
for SDKs from different providers to use the same
proxy/proxies. For example, if Android were to
provide the Domain-Selective Internet Access per-
mission (described below), advertising companies
could build their SDKs using this permission. An
app then uses the SDK as a library and may well be
oblivious to the existence of the proxy, because the
SDK itself invokes the proxy-specific API.
To make proxy distribution efficient, we envision
them being in a special “Proxies” section of the
Play Store, and SDKs ship with metadata describ-
ing which proxies they require. When installing an
app using that SDK, if the required proxy(ies) is
not already on the device, it gets retrieved and in-
stalled. When a new proxy is installed, it requests
permissions just like Android apps do today, and
the user can choose to grant them or not. In other
words, proxies get no special privileges. Split prox-
ies, such as the Domain-Selective Internet Access
proxy, could as well be incorporated in Android di-
rectly.
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Figure 2: Our proposed Split/Merge Permissions Proxy archi-
tecture. Here, A1 follows the traditional style of Android per-
missions, and requests its permissions directly from the OS,
whereas A2 requests the semantically meaningful permissions
to collect usage statistics and communicate with its server.
Compared to today’s permission system, our pro-
posed system requires strictly less trust from the end
user, because no new low-level permissions are cre-
ated. We expect there to be much fewer proxies than
apps (proxies can be thought of as libraries) and
would be written and signed by well-known, trust-
worthy companies. Even when proxies are written
by untrusted developers, they are still small pieces
of code (a few hundred LOC), have no UI, and can
be easily verified using code inspection and/or spe-
cialized tools [8, 7], and then certified by the app
store provider or the handset manufacturer; some of
them could ship with Android.
3.2 Split Proxies
If a permission is too coarse to enable the “least
privilege” principle, it needs to be split. We illus-
trate here how we split the general Internet access
permission using the Domain-Selective Internet Ac-
cess proxy, and split storage access using the Selec-
tive SD Card Access proxy.
Android offers one permission for all network
communication with the outside world; an app with
this permission can perform any network activity,
ranging from GET-ing data over HTTP to listening
on server sockets. We use the Domain-Selective In-
ternet Access proxy to split this permission into
finer-grained ones, based on the domains that the
app wants to communicate with. The proxy ac-
cepts wildcard specifications, to enable communi-
cation with many subdomains. For example, a BBC
news app may request, at installation time, network
access to “*.bbc.co.uk.”
The situation is similar when using phone
storage, and apps use the SD card in a rather
chaotic manner. Many applications create a folder
on the root of the SD card and use it to store files,
configuration files, or even backup files, with no
naming convention at all. Even though newer
versions of Android specify standard ways of
storing files on the SD card, most applications on
the Play Store still use their own conventions. The
SD card can contain highly sensitive data, such
as pictures, videos, recorded conversations, and
downloaded files. Just because an application needs
to store files on the SD card does not mean that it
should have full access to the user’s personal files
or to another application’s files stored on the SD
card. We use the Selective SD Card Access proxy
to split the SD card permission into finer-grained,
folder-level access permissions: each app gets
automatically assigned its own folder, named
/sdcard/Android/data/<app_pkg>/files/
in accordance with the Android convention, and all
the app’s storage I/O is restricted to this folder and
its subfolders—in essence chroot-ing the app.
3.3 Merge Proxies
A merge proxy takes permissions that are too
low-level/technical for average users and combines
them into permissions that are more meaningful.
We illustrate this with two examples, the Collect-
Usage-Statistics and Act-as-a-Phone proxies.
An app developer may want to use Google An-
alytics to gather information on how people use
him/her app, which features are used most often,
etc. Since this data is reported to Google over
the network, it means that all such apps must re-
quest up to two permissions in addition to what they
normally need: Full Internet Access and Network
State Access (to determine when buffered statis-
tics can be flushed). The Collect-Usage-Statistics
proxy, however, layers on top of the Domain-
Selective Internet Access proxy (with access to
*.google-analytics.com) and the native Net-
work State Access permission. It defines a new per-
mission, called Collect-Usage-Statistics. Apps us-
ing Google Analytics can now, upon installation, re-
quest permission to “collect usage statistics” instead
of “full Internet access” and “network state access.”
As another example, VoIP applications usually
request a lot of permissions in order to simulate a
phone call: They need the permission to unlock the
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screen and ring the device when a phone call arrives.
Once the call is connected, they need the micro-
phone recording permission (to capture the user’s
voice) and the Bluetooth permission (if a wireless
headset is used). We introduce the Act-as-a-Phone
merge proxy to combine all these permissions. VoIP
applications (such as CSipSimple, Skype, and oth-
ers) can now request the Act-as-a-Phone permis-
sion, instead of requesting a long list of highly tech-
nical permissions. It is also conceivable for a merge
proxy to restrict certain aspects of the underlying
permissons, such as only allowing an app that is
“acting as a phone” to turn on the microphone in
response to an explicit user action.
3.4 User-Controlled Permission Slicing
In addition to provided proxies, our permission
system is also amenable to (expert) users deciding
on the fly to only selectively grant requested per-
missions. For example, a legacy app that does not
use our proposed system may request full Internet
access, but the user decides to give it access only to
specific domains that are deemed safe. If the appli-
cation never attempts to access any other domains,
all is OK, and the user is safe. If the application at-
tempts to access other domains, then blocking those
accesses would likely prevent it from functioning—
instead, our system can prompt the user, much the
way a personal firewall would do, and (upon the
user’s request) block the connection outright, let it
go through, or fake the connection and pretend that
the host is unreachable, thereby giving the app a
chance to recover and continue operating.
4 Prototype and Early Results
As a first step, we implemented the Domain-
Selective Internet Access split proxy and the
Collect-Usage-Statistics merge proxy.
Many Android apps, when communicating with
their server side, employ the DefaultHttpClient
class. We built Domain-Selective Internet Ac-
cess as described earlier, and it provides its
own implementation of the HttpClient interface,
SelectiveHttpClient, which extends the same
classes as DefaultHttpClient and offers the
same functionality. This class communicates di-
rectly with our Domain-Selective Internet Access
proxy. The proxy requests Full Internet Access from
the OS and exposes the Domain-Selective Internet
Access permission. The proxy is essentially an An-
droid service that other applications can bind to.
The service interface is defined using the Android
Interface Definition Language.
Apps using SelectiveHttpClient, instead
of requesting Full Internet Access, only request
the Domain-Selective Internet Access permission.
SelectiveHttpClient routes all traffic through
the proxy, which checks that the access requests are
being made to the domains approved by the user; if
yes, the requests are forwarded to the network.
The Collect-Usage-Statistics proxy is also built
as a normal Android app that requests a Domain-
Selective Internet Access permission and the Net-
work State Access permission, and exposes a new
Collect-Usage-Statistics permission. In our prelim-
inary prototype, the Collect-Usage-Statistics proxy
only reports to Google Analytics. The communica-
tion between apps and this proxy is done through
Android’s standard Intent Messaging API.
We analyzed many real-world apps (like Face-
book, Skype, WhatsApp, etc.) and found that they
all request Full Internet Access permission. 73% of
the Play Store apps are free, and, of those, 80% are
ad-supported [12]. These applications end up gain-
ing access to sensitive personal data, such as con-
tacts and email, GPS location, demographic data,
etc, without legitimately needing it [10]. Having
the Domain-Selective Internet Access permission
makes it possible to guard users’ information, with-
out depriving users of the wide variety of free ap-
plications or preventing developers from generating
revenue by displaying ads.
There is one caveat to the Domain-Selective In-
ternet Access permission: since Android allows
apps to modify the device’s DNS server when con-
nected to a WiFi network, it becomes possible for a
malicious app to subvert the proxy: if it can enlist
the cooperation of a rogue DNS server that supplies
a fake IP address when queried for a domain, the
app could access servers outside the list that the user
approved. In other words, this proxy is as secure as
DNS itself. This weakness can be fixed by using
DNSSEC or disabling the ability of apps to change
the DNS server configured on the phone.
Performance. From a performance perspective,
going through a proxy normally introduces over-
head. However, since most of the proxied opera-
tions are bottlenecked by the latency of I/O any-
way, the measured overhead introduced by our
proxies is not perceivable. To time HTTP inter-
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actions with and without the proxy, we created 32
DefaultHttpClient objects and used them to is-
sue 32 POST requests; the average time of the en-
tire interaction (all 32 POSTs) was on the order of
30 ms. In the case of the Domain-Selective Inter-
net Access, most of the functionally essential op-
erations deal with sockets, and have essentially the
same latency and throughput, with or without the
proxy. For Selective SD Card Access, the bottle-
neck is in the file I/O operations. Since smartphone
applications usually have a GUI, they spend most
of their time waiting for user interaction; we expect
that, even if future proxies introduce some over-
head, it would not be user-perceptible.
Deployment. We believe our proposed system is
easy to adopt and deploy today. Writing the proxies
is relatively straightforward and requires little code
(the Domain-Selective Internet Access proxy has
less than 500 LOC). Non-malicious apps should not
need to be conceptually refactored in order to use
the proposed permission system; at most they may
need to replace the use of some interfaces with those
provided by the proxies. From the developers’ per-
spective, these changes are worthwhile because they
make apps more trustworthy. Unlike today (when
users are “trained” to trust questionable apps), our
proposed system may gradually push users to dis-
trust apps that bypass the proxies and request direct
access to low-level resources.
Manageability. Permission proxies are either part
of Android or part of SDKs. We can also imagine an
after-market for “better” versions of the same prox-
ies; users can then substitute one proxy for another.
We estimate that a “power user” of Android smart-
phones will require about a couple dozen permis-
sion proxies, which compares well to the set of 130
permissions currently defined by Android [3].
Permissions Calculus. As mentioned earlier, it
is difficult for users to reason in their head (even
when they understand what a set of permissions
is about) about how a combination of permissions
might compromise privacy or security. Our sys-
tem outsources this task to proxy developers who
must now think about whether combining permis-
sions does not open up holes. It is of course good to
have this done by trusted proxy developers, but we
also believe there is an opportunity to employ a for-
mal approach—we are currently looking into using
a variant of BAN logic [6] for this.
5 Conclusion
We presented an approach for turning hard-to-
understand low-level permissions of smartphone
apps into ones that are semantically meaningful to
average users. We propose a layer of proxies be-
tween the OS and apps, which can then merge and
split low-level permissions in a way that matches
user expectations. The proxies are small, verifiable,
and require no conceptual refactoring of apps.
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